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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ZHAOJIN DAVID KE, 




PENNSYLVANIA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM;  
SALVATORE DARIGO, in both his official and individual capacities;  
GERALD VILLELLA  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-01695) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 2, 2020 
Before:  GREENAWAY, Jr., KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 







 Zhaojin David Ke appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1  We will affirm. 
I. 
 In September 2019, Ke commenced a civil rights action in the District Court 
relating to his divorce proceedings in Erie County, Pennsylvania.  According to Ke, 
counsel for the Pennsylvania State Employees Retirement System (SERS) conspired with 
his ex-wife’s counsel to obtain a domestic relations order (DRO) that unlawfully deprived 
Ke of 50% of his monthly disability benefits.  Specifically, in his pro se complaint, Ke 
claimed that: (1) SERS violated his due process rights by failing to notify him that his ex-
wife’s counsel had submitted an unexecuted draft DRO; (2) SERS violated his equal 
protection rights by failing to ensure that his disability wages were “on par with people 
who are still able to work,” Compl. ¶¶ 94-98, ECF No. 8; (3) SERS subjected him to a 
state-created danger in violation of his substantive due process rights by placing him in 
financial peril; (4) SERS’s counsel conspired with his ex-wife’s counsel to deprive him 
of his due process rights by approving a draft DRO without notifying him; and (5) SERS 
violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA) and Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) by disbursing 50% of his disability benefit to his ex-wife.2  Ke 
 
1 Ke sought reconsideration of the District Court’s order but the District Court denied 
relief.  Ke does not challenge this ruling on appeal.   
 
2 Ke also pleaded a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The District 
Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state-law claim.  Although 
Ke stated in his notice of appeal that he seeks review of this ruling, he does not address it 
in his appellate brief.  Therefore, the issue has been waived.  See United States v. Pelullo, 
399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  
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named as defendants SERS; Salvatore Darigo, in-house counsel for SERS; and Gerald 
Villella, Ke’s ex-wife’s attorney.   
 A Magistrate Judge granted Ke leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screened the 
complaint pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and determined that Ke failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.  Ke attempted to cure the deficiencies through 
an amended complaint, but the Magistrate Judge again concluded that he failed to state a 
claim and recommended that the District Court dismiss the case pursuant to 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation over Ke’s objections and dismissed the amended complaint.  
 Ke appeals.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing the amended complaint under 
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.  See Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(per curium); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  In reviewing a 
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “we accept all factual allegations as true [and] 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. 
Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).   
III. 
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case and need not repeat the 
District Court’s and Magistrate Judge’s thorough analyses here.  In brief, the District 
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Court correctly concluded that Ke failed to state a due process claim against SERS and 
Darigo because nothing in the applicable statute, regulations, or administrative policy 
indicates that SERS was required to notify Ke when his ex-wife’s counsel submitted a 
draft DRO for approval.3  Cf. 71 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 5953.1(b) (requiring notification 
to a SERS member within a reasonable period after receipt of a court-approved DRO).  
The District Court also correctly concluded that Ke failed to state an equal protection 
claim because “people who are still able to work to earn wages” are not similarly situated 
to him.  See generally Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990), 
superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1072; Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006).  Next, the District 
Court correctly concluded that Ke’s allegations that the defendants caused him financial 
harm do not support a cognizable state-created danger claim; as the Magistrate Judge and 
District Court explained, we have only applied this doctrine in instances in which a state 
actor created a danger of physical harm.  See, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 
1201-03 (3d Cir.1996).  Lastly, the District Court correctly concluded that Ke did not 
allege facts to support a claim that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis 
 
3 Because Ke failed to state a due process claim in this regard, he necessarily failed to 
state a conspiracy claim against Darigo and Villella based on the same alleged due 
process violation.  See Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 293-94 (3d Cir. 
2018) (“To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that 
persons acting under color of state law reached an understanding to deprive him of his 




of a disability in violation of § 504 of the RA or Title II of the ADA.  See Furgess v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2019).   
 We have reviewed Ke’s arguments on appeal and conclude that they are meritless.  
In particular, to the extent that Ke asserts that the Magistrate Judge improperly “took his 
case” without Ke’s consent, the case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for purposes of 
a Report and Recommendation only.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).  In addition, while 
Ke argues that the District Court was not permitted to dismiss his amended complaint 
before he served the defendants, the District Court had the authority to do so under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).  Next, contrary to Ke’s contention, the Magistrate Judge and District 
Court did not err in applying the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to 
determine whether he stated a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  See Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal).  Ke also contends that the District Court was biased 
against him.  We have carefully reviewed the record, however, and see nothing to support 
this contention.4  
IV. 
 
4 Ke also challenges the District Court’s and Magistrate Judge’s application of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to his case.  Contrary to his contention, however, neither the 
Magistrate Judge nor the District Court relied on that doctrine to conclude that none of 
the counts in the amended complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
Rather, the Magistrate Judge and District Court observed that to the extent that Ke sought 
federal court review of his divorce proceedings, such review is barred under D.C. Court 




 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the 
amended complaint. 
